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SALES
IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF GOODS SOLD IN SEALED PACKAGES-
LIABILITY OF THE MANUFACTURER
The purchaser's remedies under an implied warranty of goods sold
in sealed packages, a problem of increasing importance under modern
mercantile methods, have again presented the difficulties of satisfactory
solution in a recent case in Ohio. In that case, Nieman sued the Dow
Drug Co., retailer, and the Frieder and Sons Co., wholesaler, for per-
sonal injuries sustained as a result of the explosion of a firecracker con-
cealed in one of four cigars sold in cellophane wrappers by the Dow
Drug Co. to the plaintiff.' The charge to the jury by the trial court
authorized a verdict in favor of the plaintiff which might be based either
on the theory of implied warranty or of negligence. Under this charge
a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff as against the retailer, but
not against the wholesaler.,a In affirming the lower court's holding, the
Court of Appeals for Hamilton County held that there was an implied
warranty of merchantability imposed upon the dealer.
The problems confronting the courts in these cases are twofold:
first, the liability, if any, of the manufacturer; second, the liability, if
any, of the dealer. Section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act2 contains pro-
visions on implied warranties applicable to our immediate problem, which
section, insofar as is material here, reads: "Subject to the provisions of
this chapter and of any statute in that behalf, there is no implied war-
ranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose
of goods supplied under a contract to sell, or a sale, except as follows:
(I) When the buyer expressly, or by implication, makes known to the
seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it
appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment, whether
he be the grower or manufacturer or not, there is an implied warranty
that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose. (2) When the
goods are bought by description from a seller, who deals in goods of
that description, whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not, there
is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality."
The fact that the goods are in a sealed container does not appear to
have added any complicating factors to actions by the consumer against
the manufacturer. In sealed package cases, as in all other cases of implied
'Dow Drug Co. v. Nicman, 57 Ohio App. 19 o, 13 N.E. (zd) 13o, 6 Ohio 0. 77,
zz Ohio L. Abs. 399 (1936).
" Since no form was returned by the jury as against the wholesaler, the court said it
was to be inferred that they had found in favor of him.
Ohio G.C.-, sec. 8395.
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warranties, the privity doctrine still appears as the major point of conflict.
Many cases, if not a numerical preponderance of the more recent ones,
still refuse to overturn the early precedents which set up a rigid concept
of privity of contract. These cases demand a direct connection between
the manufacturer and consumer in order to hold the defendant on an
implied warranty.' There is noticed, however, a gradual trend by a
substantial number of courts to allow recovery by the consumer against
the manufacturer with but a minimum of emphasis on privity of contract.
This is accomplished either by admitting the necessity of privity and
finding it by the application of one of several theories, or by recognizing
that the doctrine is outmoded and repudiating it. The several theories by
which privity is found in these cases are: (i) the theory of an agency
established between the manufacturer and the dealer whereby the im-
plied warranty arises in favor of the consumer and is traceable to the
manufacturer;" (2) a concept of warranty as running with the chattel;'
(3) a theory of third party beneficiary.' This third view is set forth in
Ohio by Judge Levine in Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzno,' saying, "In
other words, this contract between the groceryman and the Ward Bak-
ing Co. to all intents and purposes was a contract entered into for the
benefit of a third party, to wit, the ultimate consumer. Whatever im-
plied warranty arises in favor of the groceryman, who established the
contractual relationship with the Baking Company, is for the benefit of
the third party, namely, the ultimate consumer." It is gratifying to
observe that the concept of privity is being broadened to permit recovery
in these cases even though there is no direct contractual relationship
between the consumer and the manufacturer. Another line of authority
is slowly developing to the effect that privity of contract is not essential
to recovery by the consumer against the manufacturer.' Still another
group of cases has been decided on the basis of a recognition of the privity
doctrine in this type of suit, but makes an exception to this rule in the
'See Burkhart v. Armour & Co., i5i Conn. 249, 16x At. 385 (z932); Pelletier v.
Dupont, Z24 Me. 269, 128 At. 186 (x925)5 Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684 ,
33 S.W. (2d) 701 (1930); Crigger v. Coca Cola Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S.W - 155
(x9i5); Dothan Chero-Cola Co. v. Weeks, x6 Ala. App. 639, 8o So. 734 (1918)5 Chysky
v. Drake Bros., 235 N.Y. 468, x39 N.E. 576, 27 A.L.R. I533 (1923).
'Hall Mfg. Co. v. Purcell, 199 Ky. 375, 251 S.W. 177 (1923); Timberland Lumber
Co. v. Climax Mfg. Co., 6x Fed. (2d) 39 (1932).
'Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 213,
Ann. Cas. x91SC, 140 (1913)5 Anderson v. Tyler, et al., 274 N.W. 48 0937).
a Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ft. Worth v. Smith, 97 S.W. (zd) 761 (Tex. Civ. App.)
(1936), holding the fact that the third party beneficiary is not known at the time the
contract arose is immaterial. He is one of a class which is sufficient, if the class is suffi-
ciently described or designated (obviously the ultimate consumer here).
* Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475 (1928).
SBrown Candy Co. v. Jensen, x19 Texas 447, 32 S.W. (2d) 227 (1930); Coca-Cola
Bottling Works v. Simpson, is8 Miss. 390, 130 So. 479 (1930) •
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case of food sold in sealed packages.9 The extreme to which courts have
felt justified in going to allow the consumer to recover on the warranty
is well illustrated by Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Co."0 wherein
the court recognizes the trend toward allowing recovery by the con-
sumer and said, "Under conditions which now surround and apply to
business of this nature it does not seem to the author that this case (sealed
packaged goods) should be decided according to strict technical principles
heretofore deemed necessary and which arose under entirely different
conditions and circumstances. * * * If privity of contract is required,
then under the situation and circumstances of modern merchandising
in such matters, privity of contract exists in the consciousness and under-
standing of all right thinking persons." Rather than strain the concept
of privity to a point where it is not privity of contract at all, it would
appear wiser to repudiate the doctrine entirely and place the manufac-
turer in a position as regards the consumer, in which the nature of the
facts justly requires him to be placed.
LIABILITY OF THE RETAIL DEALER
Several complicating factors not present in the problem of manufac-
turer liability are present in a consideration of the liability of the dealer
on an implied warranty in cases of sealed packages. Here the goods are
sealed before they reach the hands of the retail dealer, and are not opened
until after they leave his hands. In this case the dealer, by inspection,
cannot protect the consumer from injury, nor can he protect himself
from suit. Herein it appears that the superior skill and judgment of the
seller cannot be put to its proper use. Quaere, then, whether the retailer
should be held to an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,
when such a warranty requires reliance by the buyer upon the seller's
skill and judgment. The cases are in great conflict on the point, many
holding that by the very terms of the warranty, the dealer cannot be held
liable." In Kirkland v. Great Atlantc and Pacific Tea Co.,"2 it is said
" Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 90 S.W. (zd) 445 (1936);
Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Pittsburgh, ioz Pa. Sup. Ct. 515, 156 Atl. 537
(ig3i); Mlazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 6zz, i35 Pac. 633, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 213,
Ann. Cas. 1915C, 140 (1913)5 Nemela v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 1o4 S.W.
(2d) 773 (1937), on a theory of implied contract between manufacturer and the unknown
consumer; Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382, 17 A.L.R.
649 (920).
im 90 S.W. (2d) 445 (1936).
" Biglow v. Maine Central R.R. Co., i o Me. 1o5, 85 Atl. 396, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.)
627 (1912); Dothan Chcro-Cola Bottling Co. v. Weeks, z6 Ala. App. 639, 8o So. 734
(193S); Andrews & Son v. Harper, 137 Wash- 353, 242 Pac. 27 (19z6), dairy food in
original package; Walden v. Wheeler, 153 Ky. 18i, 154 S.',V. 188, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.)
597 (1913); Oindraux v. Maurice Mercantile Co., 37 Pac. (zd) 747 (1937), is based on
a statute making one who sells provisions for domestic use, impliedly warrant they are
LAW JOURNAL-JUXNE, 19 3 8
that the retailer is not liable to the purchaser of goods in sealed packages
(flour in this case) if the retailer buys from a reputable manufacturer
and the goods are without imperfection discoverable "by the reasonable
care of one skilled in dealing in and supplying goods to the public."
This seems to place a legal duty on the retailer to deal with reputable
manufacturers and should impose a liability on him for a breach of that
duty. Is it not this judgment in the choice of manufacturers which is
relied upon by the buyer? If so, then the retailer should only be liable
when he fails to comply with this duty.'"
Controversy has been raised on this point in Ohio as a result of a
dictum paragraph in the syllabus in McMurray v. Vaugh's Seed Store'4
to the effect that where the dealer sells an article in the original package
as it comes from the manufacturer, and the customer buys it knowing
there has been no inspection by the retailer, there is no implied warranty
placed on the retailer, and the retailer is not liable for damages caused
by any deleterious substance in such merchandise, of the presence of
which he had no knowledge. That case was pleaded and decided on the
basis of tort liability thus rendering the statements as to warranty obiter
dictum. This stood as the only authority on the subject of the retailer's
liability upon an implied warranty of goods in sealed containers in Ohio
until 1934 when the case of Galjatowska v. Allbrecht Co."5 was decided
in the Court of Appeals for Summit County. In that case, the plaintiff
sued a retail dealer for personal injuries sustained by her as a result of
biting upon an iron bolt contained in a can of pork and beans. The
court discussed the McMurray case"6 and said, "A close scrutiny of that
case, however, leads us to the conclusion that notwithstanding some
sound and wholesome. Held: this statute does not apply to a retailer of goods in sealed
packages where the seller had no means of knowing the condition of the contents by skill
or investigation. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Walker, io4 S.'V. (zd) 627
(1937); Race v. Krum, 2zz N.Y. 410, 118 N.E. 853 (i91o); Cook v. Darling, s6o
Mich. 475, 325 N.W. 411 (i9to); Parks v. C. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, X44- Pac.
202, L.R.A. 1917F, 473 (1934.); Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel Co., 11 7 W. Va. 68o,
186 S.E. 61o (1936); At Common-Law: Linker v. Quaker Oats Co., is Fed. Supp. 794
(1935); Scruggins v. Jones, 207 Ky. 636, 269 S.W. 743 (1925); Trafton v. Davis,
I10 Me. 318, 86 Atl. 179 (1913); Kroger Grocery and Baking Co. v. Lewelling, 165
Miss. 73, 145 So. 7z6 (1933).
.? Kirland v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 233 Ala. 404, 171 So. 735 (936).
"'See 35 Ohio Jur. p. 879 (Sales); also see Waite, "Retail Responsibility and
Judicial Law Making," 34 Mich. L. Rev. 494 (1936); see also Burkhart v. Armour &
Co., ix5 Conn. 249, 161 Atl. 385 (1932); 90 A.L.R. sz6o ('934); Grifln v. James
Butler Grocery Co., so8 N.J.L. 92, 156 Atl. 636 (1931); Giminez v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., 265 N.Y. 390, 393 N.E. 27 (3934); Ward v. Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, zo N.E. 225 (19 18); 5 A.L.R. 242 (92o) ; Cleary v. First. Nat.
Stores, 196 N.E. 868 (93S); Haller v. Rudimann, 292 N.Y. Supp. 586, 249 App. Div.
831 (1937), holding that the implied warranty includes the bottle in which the rubbing
alcohol was contained.
"4McMurray v. Vaughn's Seed Store, 117 Ohio St. 236, 157 N.E. 567 (1927).
" Goljatowska v. Fred W. Albrecht Co, Inc., 17 Ohio L. Abs. 294 (3934).
"n See note 14.
4o6
obter dicta observations therein, it is not authority for the position taken
by the defendant in error. So far as we are able to learn, the case here
presented is one of first impression in the State of Ohio * * * " The
court then quoted from Justice Cardozo's opinion in Ryan v. Progressive
Grocery Stores, Inc.," and accepted that decision as the "more sound
rule."
It is to be noticed that these two Ohio cases, as well as many other
cases, place the liability of the retailer on the basis of a warranty of
merchantability, and not on the warranty of fitness for a purpose.1 It
is then important to notice the differences in these two warranties and
their applicability. The courts are not at all in agreement as to the true
meaning of "merchantability" as used in this warranty. The most that
can be said is that it denotes some average as to quality and salability in
the existing market. It is variously used to mean "medium quality," "fair
average quality," and "fairly salable with defects known." 9 In the case
of food for human consumption, a difference in these two warranties as
to the quality factor is difficult to understand. It would seem that if food
is not merchantable as food it is not fit for a particular purpose as food.
Thus, inasmuch as the two requirements can be synonymous in food
cases, we have two possible ways to find dealer liability. Since one
requires reliance on the seller's judgment, which is difficult to find in
cases of sealed packages, and the other apparently has no such limita-
tion, 0 it would seem plausible to find dealer liability on an implied war-
ranty of merchantability in these cases, even though the court may feel
that the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is not applicable to
sealed package cases.
Another general approach to the problem is made through the cases
involving the sale of food. Both under the common law and under the
Uniform Sales Act, in cases of the sale of food for human consumption
not in sealed containers, the courts are quite uniform in holding the
retail dealer to an implied warranty of fitness for human consumption.2 '
When the food is sold in sealed containers this unanimity of decisions
disappears and some courts feel constrained to relieve the retailer in this
" Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., z55 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. :o5 (1931).
" Young v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., I Fed. Supp. rotS (1936); Bor-
chcix v. Willow Brook Dairy, z68 N.Y. i, 196 N.E. 617 (1935)5 Dow Drug Co. v.
Nieman, note I supra; Goljatozeska v. Altrecht Co., note 16 supra; Ryan v. Progressive
Grocery Stores, note 17 supra; Aron v. Sills, z4o N.Y. 588, 148 N.E. 717 (19z5).
1, z Wis. L. Rev. 38S and cases cited there; 33 Col. L. Rev. 868i I Williston, Sales,
sec. z15; Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, note 7 supra.
,. Ryan v. Progressive Stores, note 17 supra; Aron v. Sills, note IS supra.
"1 Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co., 195 Mass. 271, 54 N.E. 481, 15 Ann. Cas.
3076, xz6 Am. St. Rep. 436, xI L.R.A. (N.S.) 884 (19o8); Race v. Krum, note ix
supra; Cook v. Darling, note It supra; Parks v. C. C. Yost Pie Co., note i supra.
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case." Other courts refuse to make an exception where food in a sealed
package is involved and continue to hold the dealer to this warranty.23
It is not diflicult to understand the incentive which the courts have to
protect the consumer of food more readily than in other cases. It does,
however, appear to be fair to say that interpretations given the common
law and statutory warranties should be equally applicable in cases of
other goods sold in sealed packages. The same problems of privity,
reliance, lack of opportunity to inspect, and policy are involved in both
instances. The necessity of protection is still present, whether the goods
be in cellophane or not. Whether this necessary measure of protection
is to be achieved by the warranty of fitness or of merchantability is of
little consequence. The Sales Act does not deny such liability in sealed
package cases.
To hold the retailer to an implied warranty in these cases may
appear to be forcing him into the position of an insurer, but inasmuch as
he is adequately indemnified by the right to recover from the manufac-
turer for his damages, or by permitting the manufacturer to be made a
party defendant,2" this is not a serious objection.
We see, then, that the modern trend is to permit recovery from the
manufacturer in cases of goods in sealed packages either by a broadened
concept of privity of contract, or by repudiating the doctrine. It is
important to note, however, that such a cause of action may not be prac-
tical because of the location of the parties in different jurisdictions. Also
noted as the modern trend is the allowing of recovery from the retailer,
in a few instances on the warranty of fitness for a purpose, but more
frequently on the warranty of merchantability. Not to allow recovery in
these instances could result in the warranties in sealed package cases being
completely unavailable as a basis of recovery by the consumer because of
lack of privity with the manufacturer, and a lack of reliance on the skill
or judgment of the retailer. This is an anomalous situation to which no
court could conscientiously lend its authority.
ARTHUR W. MEIFERT
22 Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, note i i supra; Aronowitz v. F. W. Woolworth
Co., Z36 N.Y. Supp. 133, 134 Misc. z7z (99zg)i Julian v. Laubenberger 38 N.Y. Supp.
zo5z, ,6 Misc. 646 (8s6); Scruggins v. Jones, Z07 Ky. 636, z69 S.W. 743 (1925)-
"aBowman v. Woodway Stores, z58 II. App. 307 (1930); Ward v. Great Atlantic
and Pacific Tea Co., z31 Mass. 90, 12o N.E. 225, 5 A.L.R. 24z (1918); Griffin v. Butler
Grocery Co., note 13 supra; Lieberman v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Deacker Co., 191 N.Y.
Supp S93, XI7 Misc. 531 (1922).
"
4 Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, note i supra; Burkhart v. Armour & Co., note 13
supra; Gander v. Canton Provision Co., 130 Ohio St. 43, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 433 (1935)-
